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
Post Date Monday, October 29, 2007

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At a town hall meeting in Exeter, New Hampshire, last local resident Bob Roughsedge introduced Rudy Giuliani as the next mayor of the United States." No one tittered or snickered. Afterward, Roughsedge wasn't even aware of the slip, Giuliani, who is usually quick to correct, did not seem to mind either. Maybe that's because Giuliani is actually running

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TODAY'S TOP

mayor of the United States.

Giuliani is selling himself to voters on the basis of his New York's mayor. He is arguing that he has the kind of administrative experience that would prepare him to be "I've had a great deal of experience," Giuliani says. "It's not the kind of experience that helps to prepare [you to be] president if there's any experience that does." He also claims that he is an exceptionally successful mayor. "I took a city that was the capital of America, and I left a city that was the safest in America," he declares. And he is saying that his approach to governing the Big Apple is readily applicable to the nation's international problems a president would face: "The things I did as mayor of New York City, during very difficult times, are transferable to what America needs now, and that's what I'm asking people to vote for me."

Clearly, many Americans already buy the argument that Giuliani's tenure in New York has equipped him to be a successful president as he leads the GOP field in nationwide polls. But, for those who remain unconvinced, there are two questions worth posing. The first is whether Giuliani's tenure at City Hall was truly an unmitigated success he claims it to be, or whether he made any significant missteps as mayor that he could also make as president. The second, and perhaps more important, question is how Giuliani's behavior as mayor--and his underlying philosophy of government--would translate to his conduct in the White House. To answer that question requires understanding Giuliani's particular view of liberty and authority.

By the time Giuliani took office as mayor in 1994, he had already enjoyed a spectacular career as a U.S. attorney, becoming a scourge of the Mafia and Wall Street inside-traders, including Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky. In addition, he had already acquired a philosophy of government and a way of dealing with subordinates that would mark his eight years as mayor. He has now up some of this approach in his years as a prosecutor, but

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his core beliefs can be traced to his childhood in New York City. Much of his enrollment for 16 years in Catholic schools. Much of what struck liberal New Yorkers as odd about Giuliani became understandable when seen in this light.

Giuliani was born in 1944 and grew up as part of a large American extended family in Brooklyn. His grandmother lived with him and his parents, Harold and Helen D'Avanzo. His mother's brother, who was married to his father's sister, lived downstairs, and other relatives lived nearby. Family members worked for each other, loaned each other money, and some even married each other. (Rudy would marry his second wife, Regina Peruggi in 1968.) The bonds of family carried over to friends. The son of Harold Giuliani's childhood friend, Tony Carbonetti would end up working for Rudy's mayoral campaign, and his grandson would work in the Giuliani administration.

The ties of family loyalty defied conventional morality. Rudy's uncles were policemen, and another was a fireman. Uncle Leo D'Avanzo was a bookie and loan shark with extensive connections. According to Wayne Barrett's *Rudy!*--an excellent guide to Giuliani's family and upbringing--Leo was seen as a black sheep, but he remained a part of the Giuliani-D'Avanzo extended family. When Leo bought a bar in which to conduct his operations, his brother Vincent, a patrolman, secured the liquor license, and the bar itself was called "Vincent's." Leo and other members of the family, notably Harold Giuliani. And, when his son, Lewis, got in trouble, Harold and Rudy Giuliani intervened on his behalf.

Harold Giuliani led a troubled life. He wanted to be a doctor, but he couldn't see without thick glasses. Still, he lived much of his early life by his fists. In 1934, he was arrested for armed robbery and served a year and four months in Sing Sing. Afterward, he went to work in Leo D'Avanzo's bar as a bouncer and in charge of collecting loan payments and gambling debts. After the bar for several years to work as a school custodian, following a nervous breakdown, he returned.

Harold never told his son about his criminal past--Rudy only found out about it in 2000, from Barrett's biography. His father was clearly ashamed of what he had done and tried to protect Rudy from his own unsavory life. He discouraged his child from hanging around the bar with Leo's son, Lew. In 1951, he moved the family to Garden City, Long Island, to get Rudy away from the bar. His message to his son was, 'Do as I say, not as I do.' In 2001, Rudy Giuliani told *Time* magazine, "He would say over and over, 'You can't take what's not yours. You can't steal. Never lie, never steal.' and even as a young adult, I thought, 'What does he keep this for? I'm not going to steal anything.' "

His father's words, along with the example of other family members, had their effect. As a U.S. attorney, Rudy Giuliani prosecuted crooked cops, inside traders, corrupt politicians, and the Mafia. He never appears to have had any mob ties except for minor campaign infractions, to have engaged in corrupt practices. He also reproduced in his capacity as an official the extended family, bound together by loyalty that he had grown up in--albeit, in this case, with a single dominant figure. He called loyalty the "vital virtue" and surrounded himself with men and women who were sometimes termed "Yes Men." Bernard Kerik, who would serve as his police commissioner, described entering Giuliani's inner circle as analogous to becoming a "made man in a Mafia family." Like the Gennaro D'Avanzos, he also tolerated disreputable characters as long as they remained loyal.

In Catholic schools, Giuliani learned the virtue of hard discipline, but he also acquired a Catholic outlook on government and society. At Bishop Loughlin in Brooklyn, an honors school to which Giuliani commuted from Garden City, his classes were devoted to the study of religion. At Manhattan College, he had to take theology as well as ancient and modern philosophy (including Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas) in his first two years, and he studied philosophy and political

as a junior and senior. From all accounts, he took his job seriously. At one point, he even thought of becoming a

There are two aspects of Catholic philosophy that show up in Giuliani's political outlook. The first, which he would find at almost any religious school, is a tendency to view the world and history as a moral contest between good and evil. This is sharply in contrast to a secular post-Enlightenment view of individuals--from presidents to petty thieves--as products of historical forces greater than themselves. The difference between Giuliani's view and the secular one would show up in his attitude toward crime and criminals.

Second, Giuliani was exposed to a specifically Catholic (and opposed to Protestant-individualist) view of the relationship between authority and liberty--one that dates from Aquinas. Christian Aristotelianism, as spelled out in Pope Leo XIII's *Encyclical on the Nature of Human Liberty*, and still in vogue in currency today, even in the wake of Vatican II. Catholics do not see liberty as an end in itself, but as a means--a "natural endowment"--by which to achieve the common good. For this to happen, individuals have to be encouraged to use their talents well; and that is where authority comes into play. Authority, embodied by law and the state, encourages--at times, forces--individuals to contribute to the common good. Or, to put it in Aristotelian terms: Authority--by creating a just order--trumps liberty over license.

Of course, Giuliani made his career as a prosecutor rather than a philosopher, and there are certainly Catholic teachings he repudiated or ignored. In 1989, wanting the New York Conservative Party's endorsement for his GOP mayoral bid, Giuliani hid his past opposition to abortion and *Roe v. Wade*. But his attitude toward Catholic and classical political thought clearly had an impact on him. At a forum on crime in March 1994, reported in the *New York Post*, Giuliani voiced views on liberty and authority that seemed to flow from these teachings. He criticized the liberal view of seeing only "the oppressive side of authority." "What v

is that freedom is not a concept in which people can do as they want, be anything they can be," he said. "Freedom is about the willingness of every citizen to cede to lawful authority a great deal of discretion over what you do." Asked in the question period to explain what he meant, Giuliani said, "Authority protects freedom. Freedom becomes anarchy." Norman Siegel, the then-executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, said afterward that he was "floored" by Giuliani's definition of liberty and authority. "Anyone who studied philosophy at a Catholic college would have been surprised by Giuliani's words."

In the nineteenth century, Catholic thinkers used the concepts of liberty and authority to criticize democracy, but there is nothing inherently anti-democratic about Christian Aristotelianism. In U.S. politics, it claims adherents as politically diverse: from liberal Mario Cuomo--whose 1984 Democratic convention speech portraying the nation as a family was a stirring application of these principles--and conservative Pat Buchanan. But, the danger of Protestant individualism is that it can be used to rationalize plutocracy, the danger of Catholic communalism is that it can be used to rationalize a slide toward authoritarianism. Giuliani's ideas on liberty and authority were integral to his assault on crime in New York, but they also may have a penchant for using power to curtail freedom.

Unlike Irish immigrants or Jews after 1932, Italian-Americans were not committed to a particular political party. In New York, working-class Italians tended to be Democrats, while middle- and upper-class Italians tended to be Republicans. Fiorello La Guardia, who was mayor of New York from 1934 to 1945, was a middle-class progressive Republican who was closely allied with Franklin Roosevelt; Vincent Impelletteri, mayor from 1950 to 1954, was a working-class conservative Democrat. Rudy Giuliani's political life fits this changeable mold. As Barrett recounts, they were registered Democrats when they lived in Brooklyn. When they moved to middle-class Garden City, they changed their registration to Republican.

When he went to high school and college, Rudy Giuliani, like many young Catholics, fell under the spell of John and Robert Kennedy. He thought of himself as a liberal Democrat and volunteered for Bobby Kennedy's presidential campaign. He saw both men as strong leaders willing to use the full power of government to solve problems. In the Manhattan College newspaper, he praised John Kennedy's support for "strong government," and rejected the Republican "laissez-faire" approach. "The Republicans must find men who will address themselves to the problems of discrimination, of education, of public housing, and the many more problems that Senator Goldwater and company throw aside in the name of laissez-faire government," he wrote.

But Giuliani was not part of the 1960s counterculture or the New Left. He was against the Vietnam war because, he later wrote, it "didn't meet the conditions of what Catholics call a just war," but he didn't demonstrate against it. One NYU law school classmate recalled him as "a real Robert Kennedy Democrat, liberal, except on law and order." Over the next three decades, Giuliani would retain his support for a "strong, large government," but, after he became a U.S. attorney, he would see its primary purpose as ensuring law and order rather than providing jobs or eliminating poverty.

Giuliani voted for George McGovern in 1972, but, when he was appointed Ford's deputy associate attorney general, he changed his registration to Independent. In 1981, when Reagan appointed him associate attorney general, he changed his registration again, this time to Republican. In 1989, when he announced his first race for mayor of New York, he did so in a small room at the Metropolitan Republican Club where F. Lee Young had announced his own run in 1933. During the 1989 primary, Giuliani would dally with running to the left of incumbent Ed Koch, but the liberal David Dinkins defeated Koch in the Democratic primary, and, rather than running as a progressive Republican, Giuliani ran on a law-and-order platform--the same approach

would take in his successful 1993 rematch with Dinkins.

The writing of history isn't usually served well by presidential campaigns, and this one is no exception. To sum up his term, Giuliani likes to quote George Will's comment that "his years as mayor were the most successful episode of city government in this country in the last fifty years." On the other side, Giuliani's liberal opponents, eager to undermine his argument for his presidency, insist that he was a complete failure as mayor. In *Harper's*, Kevin Baker has described Giuliani as a "nothing mayor" who "accomplished almost nothing of significance." The truth in this case is somewhere in between. Giuliani had an outstanding first term and, until September 11, a second term that was less than spectacular, at times even disastrous, second term that brought out many of the weaknesses in his philosophy of city government.

Giuliani's greatest achievements in his first term were, as he would himself say, the reduction in New York's crime rate and, equally important, the reduction in the popular fear of crime. In September 1990, *Time* had run a cover story titled, "The End of the Big Apple." Five years later, *New York* magazine ran a cover story called, "The End of Crime as We Know It." Giuliani can't take all the credit for this, of course, but he approaches the credit with a strategy by which the police reduced crime and appointed a new man--Police Commissioner William Bratton--who carried out the strategy. Not coincidentally, it was a strategy that perfectly accords with his own approach to government.

When Giuliani took office in January 1994, some conservative advisers advised him to focus on cutting taxes. Influenced by the Manhattan Institute, Giuliani had begun to embrace the free-market economic theories he had once scorned, but he still had other priorities. "Tax cuts are important, but so are other things like law enforcement," he told supply-sider Lawrence Kudlow in a discussion that winter. Giuliani also rejected the liberal argument that, in order to reduce crime, he would have to address social causes, such as unemployment or poverty. Instead, he

problem as a contest between right and wrong--moral license--in which he would have to use the authority of the police to strengthen the former.

Through the efforts of Fred Siegel, editor of the Manhattan Institute's *City Journal*, Giuliani became acquainted with the "broken windows" theory of crime prevention. It focuses on stopping the disorder--broken windows--that created a permissive atmosphere. Disorder, criminologist George Kelling would consist of "youths hanging out on the corner, panhandling and suggestively dressed prostitutes on the street, public drunkenness and rowdiness." According to Kelling, public disorder of this kind eventually led to "serious crime as Kelling proposed that police patrol neighborhoods to deter and, if necessary, arrest--the perpetrators of disorder. The broken windows theory fit Giuliani's view of liberty and authority meant that, in order to create order and encourage moral behavior, citizens would have to allow the police to discourage behavior that was often only marginally illegal.

Giuliani hired Bratton, Boston's police chief, to put the broken windows theory into practice--and, supplemented by the innovative use of computers to single out and target high-crime neighborhoods, it had a dramatic effect on New York's crime rate. Giuliani's detractors would later say that the decline began under Mayor Koch but that is misleading. The city's murder rate reached a high in 1990, then declined slightly over the next two years. It was only after Giuliani took office that the crime rate fell precipitously--starting in 1994, when it fell by 12 percent. New York's reduction in crime also far exceeded the national average: 16 percent in the first half of 1995 compared to one percent nationally.

Giuliani enjoyed similar success in driving the Mafia out of the Fulton Fish Market and the commercial garbage business. He also reduced fraud in New York's welfare rolls--no small accomplishment. From 1989 to 1995, more than 270,000 New Yorkers were added to the welfare rolls. After Giuliani

fingerprint checks and home visits in 1995--an infringement of liberty to be sure--the welfare rolls declined by 18 percent a year.

Giuliani easily won reelection in 1997 and enjoyed wide popularity--even in parts of the black community. Black leaders like the Reverend Floyd Flake appreciated that Giuliani's methods--however intrusive--had revived neighborhoods that had been ravaged by drugs and guns. As journalist Andrew Ross Klein wrote in his book on the Giuliani years, "The essential truth is that life on the streets was calmer, safer, saner--was just as relevant to the poor of Bed-Stuy as to the prosperous of Upper East Side Heights."

Yet, by 2001, Giuliani's last year in office, he was widely unpopular in the black community. New Yorkers, fearing the onset of political disorder, were "holding their breath" waiting for him to leave office, according to John Mollenkopf, an urban policy expert at the City University of New York. The reason for the shift, Giuliani, emboldened by his initial success, had gone to the extreme exercise of authority.

Giuliani's seemingly insatiable appetite for authority was evident first and foremost, in the way he ran his administration. As always, with loyalty, he demanded that power be centralized in his hands and that he receive credit for any of the administration's achievements. Even the Department of Environmental Conservation's daily reports on the water level in the reservoir had to be approved through Giuliani's press office before being released. He replaced Dinkins-era officials with loyalists, some of whom had little preparation for their jobs. Tony Carbonetti, the grandfather of Harold Giuliani's friend, was put in charge of the Office of Office Appointments, even though his previous experience consisted mostly of running a bar in Boston. According to Kirtzinger's agency estimated that, of patronage hires, 60 percent were unqualified, 20 percent had no experience, and 20 percent were "dirtbags." Among these hires was Carbonetti's father, named director of the Community Assistance Unit. He

to resign after admitting that he had two driver's licenses failed to pay \$156,000 in liens and judgments against his businesses.

The most important casualty of this process was Bratton besides Giuliani himself, who was most responsible for the administration's early success. Whenever the press gave credit to Bratton, the police chief and his spokesman Johnson would be called into city hall to be bawled out by Giuliani loyalists. Miller was finally forced to quit. After *Time* magazine on its cover in January 1996, an enraged Giuliani had Giuliani's attorneys begin investigating his personal expenses. That was enough for Bratton. He quit two months later.

In *The Prince of the City*, Fred Siegel called Giuliani's replacement of Bratton "the single biggest mistake" of his administration. Bratton was replaced by a colorless bureaucrat and "YesRudy" named Howard Safir who lacked Bratton's understanding of the broken windows theory and would prove incapable of managing Giuliani's excesses. These began soon after Safir was appointed. Eager to accelerate the decline in New York's crime rate, Safir pressed Safir to triple the size of the Street Crime Unit, a group that swept into neighborhoods and implemented the broken windows strategy. Under Bratton, these units had operated with discretion, sometimes attempting to resolve situations by making arrests, often acting as community relations specialists. But, wrote Siegel, "rapid expansion was achieved through diminished training and by sending untested units out without a veteran heading the team."

In 1997, the police stopped and frisked 27,000 citizens, a 50% increase from the year before. Those who were stopped included members of the black middle class, including the deputy mayor Rudy Washington. Resentment rose in inner city neighborhoods. Then, a series of brutal incidents set off protests: In February 1999, four inexperienced members of the Street Crime Unit killed Amadou Diallo, an unarmed African vendor. And, in March 2000, an undercover narcotics officer

killed an unarmed security guard, Patrick Dorismond. In trying to placate his angry constituents, Giuliani, convinced of his righteousness, inflamed them. To discredit Dorismond, Giuliani released his nugatory juvenile arrest record and said he was an "altar boy." Ironically, it turned out Dorismond *was* an altar boy and had attended the same Catholic high school as Giuliani.

Giuliani also pushed the concept of broken windows what Kelling and Bratton had envisaged. On the basis of an article in *City Journal*, Giuliani decided that he needed to suppress not only petty criminals, but also jaywalkers, street vendors, bicycle messengers, and reckless taxi drivers. "If we do not maintain a certain level of civil manner here, we can't thrive as individuals or as a city of the world," Giuliani announced in February 1998. Giuliani's new campaign, billed "Creating a More Civil City," was met with strikes from cab drivers and food vendors, as well as angry reactions from citizens threatened with arrest for jaywalking. Giuliani finally gave up on it, but, the next year, he took on the New York art scene. He tried to stop the Brooklyn Museum from putting on a provocative show, "Sensation," which he called "junk stuff." Giuliani's attempt to cut off city funding for the museum and fire its trustees was defeated in court.

Andrew Kirtzman attributes Giuliani's threats against the Brooklyn Museum to a desire to curry favor with uptown New Yorkers whose votes he would have needed to win the 2000 Senate election against Hillary Clinton. And, indeed, Giuliani currently brags about his bid to shut down the exhibit to woo social conservatives. But this move, like his police expansion of the Street Crime Unit and his crackdown against street vendors and jaywalkers, was consistent with Giuliani's growing commitment to use his authority at the expense of liberty.

Perhaps the most telling example of Giuliani's attempt to assert his authority came after September 11. In the crisis created by the terrorist attacks, Giuliani excelled as a leader. He was eloquent, a voice of reassurance while the president, al

Force One, remained curiously silent. But, even before had settled over Ground Zero, Giuliani began lobbying York legislature to repeal the city's two-term limit so h again, while simultaneously pressuring the candidates his office to accept a 90-day extension of his term. Giu moves showed a reluctance to cede power and a conter democratic process. It was a demonstration of how far go in the pursuit of authority.

Of course, if Giuliani were elected president in Novem he might have no interest in resuming the push for eve spheres of authority that accelerated in his second term But he has given no indication that he has rethought th Indeed, he now seems to revel in the opposition he pro back and read *The New York Times* editorials at that tir they were saying about me, and all of the others," Giu recently advised an audience of social conservatives in Washington.

So it is reasonable to take Giuliani at his word and to i presidency as an extension of his mayoralty. To do tha contemplate an administration that would challenge m: Americans' conception of their own liberty. It would p the worst aspects of Bush's imperial presidency: the co Congress and the press; the encouragement of a polariz the centralization of power in the White House; and th administration of government based upon loyalty rathe competence. That may be something a sizeable chunk Republican voters want--but it is not something that w most Americans.

There is one final matter to consider: Giuliani's claim t accomplished in New York is "transferable" to the nati whole. Put simply, that idea is impossible, disastrous, c misleading. Giuliani cannot export welfare reform from York to the federal government, since national welfare already happened. A broken windows strategy probabl help the FBI unearth white-collar crime or catch terror

Giuliani claims he will "control spending" as he did in but, in fact, the budget went up 37.6 percent during his leaving his successor with a large deficit even before S 11. As for cutting taxes, which Giuliani has also promised most of his New York tax cuts were relatively minor--the important ones were initiated by the state. And, in any case, president will have difficulty selling still another tax cut in the face of huge deficits.

The centerpiece of Giuliani's claim, however, is the suggestion that his approach to fighting crime provides a model for conducting foreign policy. In a recent essay for *Foreign Affairs* he wrote: "I know from personal experience that when order is reliably established in a troubled part of a city, normal life reestablishes itself: shops open, people move back in, cars start playing ball on the sidewalks again, and soon a de facto law-abiding community returns to life. The same is true in world affairs. Disorder in the world's bad neighborhoods tends to spread. Tolerating bad behavior breeds more bad behavior."

This is a foolish analogy. In policing the world, the United States cannot claim to be enforcing its own laws; we lack legitimacy to do so, as we found after invading Iraq. When the NYPD polices poor neighborhoods, it was not an occupying force; when the military took over Baghdad, it was, and it suffered the consequences. Some of the "neighborhoods" Giuliani wants to clean up, such as Iran, possess their own armies and can defend themselves. Other "neighborhoods," such as Russia and China, do not attempt to punish them for bad behavior. In short, the situation in New York writ large, and the trade-offs between authority and liberty look very different from the White House than they do at the Manhattan Mansion. But these distinctions seem lost on the man vying to be the next mayor of the United States.

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I don't know to what degree Giuliani's authoritarianism can be laid at the feet of his Catholic upbringing. And I'm not interested in their roots anyway. I'm more concerned with how would Giuliani be like as a President and (even more so) how can we prevent it? Giuliani was probably exactly what New York City needed when he was first elected Mayor. I remember taking my girlfriend up there when I was a teenager in the 90s. We stayed with my uncle and hung out with all his west side Jewish liberal friends. Those guys loved Giuliani then. The city needed a Giuliani to get it in order. But the American emphatically does not need a Giuliani. We need the reverse Giuliani, if anything.

ratnerstar

John Judis believes that if we get down on our knees and apologize and beg for mercy Bin Laden and the rest of the Islamo-fascists will forgive us for letting gays live and be around loose. I don't think John is right. Does anybody believe such nonsense that hasn't been decorticated by the cult of correctness? The John Judases of the thirties and forties were in opposition to Hitler and then to Stalin. Today they are in opposition to Bin Laden and Ahmedinejad. Déjà vu all over again. The radical left has made common cause with Islamo-fascists. On the surface Islamo-fascists and leftists are opposites, but they share a hatred of western civilization which has become the basis of their current alliance.

bulbman1066

All the hot air here about Giuliani being the anti-post-Enlightenment, Catholic authoritarian, son-of-a-crook, credit-away-from-Bratton, possible-future-mayor-of-New-York, unloved by the ACLU, creepy [but admittedly highly intelligent] former mayor of New York, written by some erstwhile critic named Judas [or Judis] is calculated, slanted and

significant to the real essence of Giuliani as the flatulent amoeba.

juandeveras

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